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Abstract. Th is article argues for a clearer framework of internet-based “memes”. Th e 
science of memes, dubbed ‘memetics’, presumes that memes remain “copying units” 
following the popularisation of the concept in Richard Dawkins’ celebrated work, Th e 
Selfi sh Gene (1976). Yet Peircean semiotics and biosemiotics can challenge this doctrine 
of information transmission. While supporting a precise and discursive framework for 
internet memes, semiotic readings reconfi gure contemporary formulations to the – 
now-established – conception of memes. Internet memes can and should be conceived, 
then, as habit-inducing sign systems incorporating processes involving asymmetrical 
variation. So, drawing on biosemiotics, Tartu-Moscow semiotics, and Peircean semiotic 
principles, and through a close reading of the celebrated 2011 Internet meme Rebecca 
Black’s Friday, this article proposes a working outline for the defi nition of internet memes 
and its applicability for the semiotic analysis of texts in new media communication.
Keywords: memetics; internet memes; sign systems; semiotic analysis; translation; 
remix; virality; habituescence
Introduction
Th e newest forms of media have established internet memes. Such technologies embed 
most, perhaps all, of the key features that seem to characterize new media artefacts, 
such as participation, self-organization, free labour, amateur culture, networks, and 
even virality. In league with the popularity of internet memes is the ubiquity of social 
media across diff erent technological devices such as computers, mobile phones, TVs, 
tablets, watches and any ordinary devices that can be re-shaped by internet mobile 
technology. Th e ubiquity of social media, across platforms and personal devices, have 
furthered the notion of universality peculiar to memes.  
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Today, internet memes raise increasingly legitimate cases during web-based and 
mobile applications whereby users prescind their awareness about dynamic feeds, pop-
up boxes and ever-changing off -topic (OT) sections of forums. Th ese emergent forms 
of new media can take the form of still-images as well as audio-visual material via 
videos and animations. A famous example of a still-image internet meme is Grumpy 
Cat which originated when pictures of a supposedly grumpy-looking cat (Fig. 1) were 
posted on the Reddit website (Grumpy Cat 20121), subsequently re-posted on the 
same site with text added (Fig. 2) and contextualized within other images (Fig. 3a 
and 3b) then to leak onto mainstream social networking sites as Facebook. Grumpy 
Cat was eventually seen peeking on a Lloyd bank’s advert (0.15’’, in Moving Out, UK, 
2013) on national TV. Th is transference is evidence that internet memes have been 
incorporated into the commercial culture associated with mass communication and 
broadcast media.
A notable example of an audio-visual internet meme includes Downfall or “Hitler 
reacts to…” which features modifi ed video sequences taken from the German drama 
Der Untergang (Constantin Film, Germany, 2004). Film sections feature Adolf Hitler 
losing his temper and scolding his commanders who all, in the remix, become the 
focus of farcically-subtitled parodies where Hitler tirades over trivialities such as “Ben 
Affl  eck being cast as Batman”, “Twilight the Movie” (2009), or even anachronistic 
appropriations of when “Hitler phones Muammar al-Gaddafi ” (2009), where the 
Libyan ex-leader’s thoughts are provoked about Hitler’s polemic (referring to Mein 
Kampf). Roehampton University in London produced a promotional Downfall video 
where “Hitler reacts to the new Film MA at the University of Roehampton” (2013). 
Now, when banks and educational establishments turn their attention to Internet 
memes, albeit for marketing purposes, it is safe to assert that this trend now poses a 
mature cultural phenomenon and invites systematic media scrutiny. Yet despite the 
enshrined legitimacy of Internet memes to Web and App audiences, their relevance has 
only recently proved a fruitful fi eld of critical enquiry (Davison 2012, 2014; Goriunova 
2014; Knobel, Lankshear 2007). Th is is why discursive treatments of internet memes 
are arguably still in its infancy.
Ironically, instead of academic publications, the most comprehensive and dynamic 
source of information on internet memes appears to be best covered in online sources 
and electronic ephemera. Of course, web sites present a rich source of primary data 
on the historiography of internet memes whilst grounding any serious study of the 
issue; however, Davison (2012: 122) recognizes how amongst the notable online 
meme-sources (Wikipedia, Urban Dictionary, Know Your Meme, Encyclopedia 
Dramatica), “none does so in an academically rigorous way” and so “Internet memes 
1 Grumpy Cat 2012 was accessed at http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/grumpy-cat 
accessed 16 January 2014.
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lack an accurate defi nition…” especially since attempts at defi ning this cultural device 
invariably prove whimsical and inconsistent. Appropriately, then, Wikipedia explains 
that “[a]n Internet meme is a concept that spreads from person to person via the 
Internet” (Wikipedia 20122; my italics, S. C.). On the other hand, Urban Dictionary 
conceives of an Internet meme as “A short phrase, picture, or combination of the 
two that gets repeated in message boards […]” (Urban dictionary 2014,3 my italics, 
S. C.). Th ese divergent views are contradictory since, to invoke Sebeok and Danesi’s 
terms (2000: 1), it remains unclear whether an Internet meme is a mental form or 
an externalized form (i.e. a representation). Moreover, let us consider this statement 
from Techopedia (2014): “An Internet meme is an activity, concept, catchphrase 
or piece of media that gains popularity and spreads rapidly via the Internet”.4 Th is 
delimited defi nition off ers little clarity because it posits a hopeless equivalence 
between particulars and thereby hopes to prove its universal justifi ability. Th e origins 
of this short-sighted deduction can be traced back to an earlier academic statement as 
enunciated by Dawkins, the fi rst and chief proponent of memes: “Examples of memes 
are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building 
arches” (Dawkins 2006[1976]: 192). It is here that Dawkins confl ates ethereal forms 
with externalized references, and codes with instantiation of codes, an ambiguity that 
is then transposed on to popular defi nitions of internet memes. 
Another theoretical ambivalence rehearses a linguistic discourse as it applies to 
internet memes: Urban Dictionary states that “An ‘Internet Meme’ is a word, phrase, 
expression, iconic imagery or recognizable reference popularized amongst online 
communities such as on forums or in online games” (Urbandictionary 2014; my italics, 
S. C.), whereas popular platform Whatis contends that “An internet meme is a cultural 
phenomenon that spreads from one person to another online” (Whatis 20145; my italics, 
S. C.). Th e fi rst defi nition implies that an internet meme is a single entity, whereas the 
latter, broader defi nition posits, instead, how memes consist at the very least of a set of 
objects (a cultural phenomenon). Th is disparity not only shows the incoherence that 
characterizes Web-based lexicography, but also suggests that internet memes are protean 
ideas whose reasonable limits prove insurmountable when examined.    
2 Th e Wikipedia defi nition was retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_meme 
on 15 January 2012.
3 Urban Dictionary 2014. Internet memes. Available at http://it.urbandictionary.com/defi ne.
php?term=internet%20meme; was accessed on 5 February 2014.
4 Techopedia 2014. Internet meme. Available at http://www.techopedia.com/defi nition/ 
16944/internet-meme; was accessed on 4 February 2014.
5 Whatis 2014. Internet meme. Available at http://whatis.techtarget.com/defi nition/Internet-
meme and accessed on 5 February 2014.
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Figure 1. Th e original picture of the cat which was nicknamed ‘Grumpy Cat’  due to its 
downward-pointing ‘lips’.
 
Figure 2. Modifi ed version of ‘Grumpy Cat’ with added text.
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Figure 3a. 
 
Figure 3b. ‘Grumpy Cat’ contextualized within other famous images as the ‘Monna Lisa’ and the 
‘Royal Baby’, both recognized as depicting notable grim smiles.
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On the other hand, recent academic treatments of internet memes appear to adapt 
their defi nitional approaches from soft ware and photography studies, grounding 
their premises in the formal aspect of the internet meme, and then almost casually 
making considerations and conclusions about semantics (content) or pragmatics 
(context of use). For example, Nooney and Portwood-Stacer (2014: 249) start with 
the formal dimension of internet memes as they assert that “Th e designation meme 
identifi es digital objects that riff  on a given visual, textual or auditory form” and make 
a consideration of pragmatics when they mention how these are “then appropriated, 
re-coded, and slotted back into the internet infrastructures they came from”, referring 
to their dynamics. Similarly, Davison (2014: 291) considers how the soft ware 
impressions of ‘rage maker’ (a soft ware oft en used for making internet memes) make 
technical limitations visible and compares it to the photo-realist soft ware techniques 
of Photoshop. Th is approach traces the indexical relation of the cultural form with the 
reality it represents, and thus takes the discussion of internet memes to a semantic 
dimension. Whilst distorting ideas from aesthetics under the discursive paradigms of 
linguistics, such garbling remains an issue for any precise meaning of the elusive and 
protean notion of memes.
Origins of the meme species
In 1994, Mike Goodwin wrote a piece in the magazine Wired which described 
“Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies”. Th is law posited that as an online discussion 
grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1 
(Goodwin 19946). Th is law was based on what Goodwin termed the Nazi-comparison 
meme. According to knowyourmeme.com’s editor Brad (2009), this was one of the 
early use of the term ‘meme’ in association to internet culture7.
Born 20 years or so before this juxtaposition, the concept of meme was inaugurated 
by Richard Dawkins in his book Th e Selfi sh Gene (1976) and then popularized by 
Hofstadter and Dennett’s Th e Mind’s I (1981). Dawkins pioneered the inherently vital 
principle of genes that ‘selfi sh’ survival of the species relied on genes as selfi sh agents: 
a “revolutionary” position later dubbed ‘gene selectionism’ (e.g., Hoff meyer 2008: 
75). But Dawkins’ eff orts were not limited to biology – he in fact imported this view 
to the understanding of culture. Dawkins contended that “cultural transmission is 
analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative, it can give 
6 Goodwin, Mike 1994. Meme, counter-meme. Wired 10. Available at https://www.wired.com/
1994/10/godwin-if-2/ and accessed on 13 September 2016.
7 Brad 2009. Godwin’s Law. Available at http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/godwins-law 
and accessed on 13 June 2016.
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rise to a form of evolution” (Dawkins 2006[1976]: 189). Th at is why he proposed to use 
the concept of ‘meme’ to provide his evolutionary view of culture with an analytical 
model: meme is an abbreviation for mimeme, a cognate related to the Greek ‘mimesis’ 
with its etymology overlapping the English word ‘mime’ and ‘mimicry’ or the French 
‘même’, (‘the same’). An ‘idea-meme’ was defi ned as an entity that is capable of being 
transmitted from one brain to another through imitation (Dawkins 2006[1976]: 196), 
and in this sense is replicated more or less successfully. Propositionally, Dawkins 
explained that an example of a very successful meme is the monotheistic dogma 
wherein “God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or infective 
power, in the environment provided by human culture” (Dawkins 2006[1976]: 192–
193). So, for Dawkins, memes as information-rich and contagious units would be the 
key to cultural evolution in a similar manner in which genes would be powerful agents 
in biological evolution. But, the predicate of this once convincing position weakened 
as the diff use meaning of ‘meme’ proved recalcitrant. 
Further, ‘meme’ was pressed into widespread use in the study of culture by 
linguistic and technology scholars of ‘memetics’ during the 1990s, especially aft er the 
publication of Blackmore’s Th e Meme Machine (1999). Dawkins’ views on culture (or 
perhaps his preoccupation with organized religion) were so infl uential that ‘memetics’ 
or the science of memes was born. Th anks to Dawkins, the identifi able ‘memeticians’ 
claimed they had found an appropriate framework for graft ing evolutionary enquiry 
beyond the purely biological world and onto the social sciences (Dawkins 1976; Lynch 
1996; Blackmore 1999; Rose 1998; Wilkins 1998). At bottom, the aim of the new fi eld 
was not so diff erent from that of contemporary semioticians who have turned their 
attention to biosemiotics in the quest to explore the natural constraints and aff ordances 
of culture. However, memetics lacked the centuries-long background in the study of 
culture that biosemiotics, drawing on semiotics, avails itself of.8 Hence the growth of 
the novel discipline of memetics was adventitious, since Dawkins’ original comparison 
of memes as metaphors, was reductively misconstrued by his epigones. Blackmore 
argues this case in light of how Dawkins’ secular preoccupations compounded an 
already obscure term applicable to religions and ideologies permitting mutations like 
“idea viruses”, besides an escalating sacred and profane array of analogies (Burman 
2012). It is no surprise that memetics’ attempt at forging a new theory of cultural 
evolution was short-lived. In fact, the Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary Models of 
Information Transmission lasted only a handful of years, from 1997 until 2005. 
During this time, a number of critiques of the memetic model of culture appeared 
in the Journal of Memetics itself (Gatherer 1998; Rose 1998; Sperber 2000; Edmonds 
2002, 2005). According to Edmonds (2005), the meme-gene analogy proved a waning 
8 See for example, the roots of semiotics in ancient Greek and medieval logic as recollected 
in Deely 1982.
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gimmick. Th e “narrow” approach to memetics as he called it, had not provided any 
extra explanatory power than other evolutionary approaches to culture. In fact,
[t]he central core, the meme-gene analogy, has not been a wellspring of models and 
studies which have provided “explanatory leverage” upon observed phenomena.  
Rather, it has been a short-lived fad whose eff ect has been to obscure more than it 
has been to enlighten.  I am afraid that memetics, as an identifi able discipline, will 
not be widely missed. (Edmonds 2005 2005, sine pagina.)
Th rough decline, such a critique continues to be sanctioned by those commentators 
who rely on memetic theory or allied jargon when bandying about internet memes. 
As Goriunova points out, in academia “it is commonplace to refer, oft en rather 
uncritically, to the term’s exodus from Richard Dawkins’ 1976 book Th e Selfi sh Gene” 
(Goriunova 2013). Tellingly, Edmonds traduces the inured discourse of memetics, 
with regard to its place for modelling communication, social phenomenon and sundry 
evolutionary-based complexes. Edmonds (2005, sine pagina) concludes that “work 
within this approach is oft en done without appealing to ‘memes’ or ‘memetics’ since 
it can be easily accommodated within other frameworks”. One such contextualizing 
framework is semiotics, which can, within its broader discourse, examine key 
assumptions in memetics, such as its tropes of unit, copying and viral growth.
Unit vs. system 
A number of statements in memetics remain prohibitively vague or needlessly gnomic 
whenever these statements are examined by semiotics; but for brevity, any immediate 
analysis engenders a conspicuous array of tropes which can be characterized by (a) 
memes as cultural units of information; (b) distributable (cultural) patterns replicated 
among individuals; and (c) aleatory entities encrypted as the virus metaphor. Th e 
following views embed point (a). Accordingly, a meme includes:
(1) [A] unit of cultural transmission, or unit of imitation (Dawkins 1976).
(2) [Th e] largest units of socially transmitted information that reliably and repeatedly 
withstand transmission (Pocklington, Best 1997: 81).
(3) Th e unit of cultural evolution and selection (Wilkins 1998).
(4) Unit of information in a mind whose existence infl uences events such that copies of 
itself get created in other minds (Brodie 1996: 32).
Th ese statements betray the perplexing assumption that, somehow, memes are ‘units’ 
as they are ‘particles’. Dawkins explains why he elects this atomistic model of culture, 
namely, “the existence of easily repeated and remembered cultural elements such 
as choruses, tunes, recipes, expressions, fi gures of speech and religious rites suggest 
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that at least some elements of culture can be described as discrete cultural particles” 
(Dawkins 2006: 81; my italics, S. C.). Now, since Dawkins off ers a material basis 
to some very abstract phenomena, a helpful method to disambiguate his position 
comes from the pioneering work fi rst put forward by the code-breaking labours of 
post-war communication engineering. In its theoretical infancy information was 
defi ned as a data unit, a discrete entity, which, although a fully describable binary 
unit (Szilard 1929), became transmogrifi ed under Shannon and Weaver into unit 
selected in the source. Nevertheless, both conceptions of information share a common 
ground as they conceive of a unit of selection. Th us the unit principle in memetics 
shares its meaning with this earlier work carried out in information theory. Aft er 
all, ideals of communication and information proved indispensable for the growth 
of computational networking and packet-relay of online information, which in turn 
supports the meme principle universally.
It should be reminded however how ‘units’ of signifi cation are also a key concern 
of structuralism and are particularly prominent in the semiological analysis of 
cultural artefacts. Drawing on Saussure’s general linguistics, semiologists set out to 
analyse everyday instances of culture. Th ey did so by isolating the signifi cation units 
in a parole, identifying syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations amongst such units 
and reconstructing the higher system of signs, or langue. Providing an example of 
semiological analysis, Culler (1976: 104) explains how 
[i]n the food system […] one defi nes on the syntagmatic axes the combinations 
of courses which can make up meals of various sorts; and each course or slot can 
be fi lled by one of a number of dishes which are in paradigmatic contrast with 
one another (one wouldn’t combine roast beef and lamb chops in a single meal: 
they would be alternatives on the menu). Th ese dishes which are alternatives to 
one another oft en bear diff erent meanings in that they connote varying degrees of 
luxury, elegance, etc.
Semiology was concerned with identifying elements of signifi cation as embedded in 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. Th is very tame conception of culture and 
cultural understanding, free of the vagaries of ‘interpretation’, resonates much with 
memetics’ interest in isolating units of information in culture.
However, the atomistic conception of culture as an aggregation of units or discrete 
particles, was already rejected by exponents of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics 
in the 1960s (and Kroeber and Kluckhohn drawing on conceptualizations before their 
1952 publication). Th e school’s most important characteristic was that “it capitalised 
on the totality of culture, not the segmentation thereof ” (Broms et al. 1988: 3). 
Th e major exponent of Tartu Semiotics, Juri Lotman, held that “diff erent semiotic 
phenomena come into a researcher’s view not as separate isolated phenomena, but 
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rather as parts of a vast picture” (Lotman cited in Chernov 1988: 14). In order to 
avoid treating culture as merely the sum of its parts, Lotman (1967) had come up 
with the idea of the semiosphere, an evolving system of signs that is more than the 
sum of its parts. Th anks to developments in semiotics, by the end of the 1980s the 
idea of a ‘cultural unit’ was tackled, criticized, and more holistic models of cultural 
information were proposed (see, e.g., Sebeok 1991[1988]; Even-Zohar 1986). Th is is 
the kind of theoretical development in cultural studies that was probably ignored by 
the proponents of memetics theory.
Indeed, the idea that a dynamic system (such as information, culture, or an 
organism’s development) could be considered as a set of ‘units’ was also criticized in 
cybernetics, which, ironically, built on and surpassed information theory. Psychologist 
Gregory Bateson had criticized Darwinist evolutionary theory for “[it] contained the 
error of considering the basic unit of survival as the individual organism under natural 
selection” (Bateson 2000[1970]: 457) when in fact, the unit of survival should be a 
fl exible organism in its environment. Th is means that in biology, the system under 
study should be the whole system (system plus environment) and not the isolated 
system alone. Th erefore, in a similar manner in which an organism cannot be studied 
in isolation from its environment, cultural information cannot be a discrete entity 
that can be studied in isolation from its context (or several contexts) either. Th is 
lesson is inherent in biosemiotics too. Hoff meyer criticizes the physicalist account of 
information that refers to information as “isolated facts” or “chunks of knowledge” 
(Hoff meyer 1996: 63). Instead, information is a relational entity (Hoff meyer 2008: 29) 
which must be conceived in terms of relevance (‘information as a diff erence which 
makes a diff erence’) and continuity (‘the pattern which connects’) sensu Bateson. 
Or, in Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough! (2008), Brier proposes 
that information should be considered in relation to fi ve epistemological levels: 
fi rstness (qualia), secondness (causality), information (or quasi-semiotics), biological 
communication, cultural paradigms (Brier 2008: 389–390). Hence information is a 
much more complex business than a mere unit, as Dawkins proposed and memeticians 
re-iterated. Directly addressing memetics’ misconception of information, Deacon 
states, “[Dawkins] ignores that what counts as information is context dependent. By 
ignoring context, he brackets out consideration of systemic origin of gene (and meme) 
information, and its means of replication” (Deacon 1999; my italics, S. C.). Th erefore, 
in light of more sophisticated treatments of information in Tartu-Moscow semiotics, 
biosemiotics and cybersemiotics, information appears to be a relational-systemic 
phenomenon, not an atomic one.
A shift  in conceiving of information must result in a shift  in conceiving of memes 
too. So if memes were to be considered as relational rather than discrete information 
(or units), then they should also be considered in conjunction with their wider cultural 
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context or as elements of a constitutive system – that is, a system made of elements 
and relations, whose parts cannot be studied in isolation but only in relation to other 
parts (cf. Bertalanff y 1968). In this view, memes would be relational entities and not 
discrete entities as the memeticians contended. Interestingly, even in digital culture, all 
those who sets out to say something meaningful about internet memes, whether new 
media scholars or grassroots web writers, intuitively adopt the notion of ‘information 
as relational’. Th ey do so despite oft en advocating the groundings of their work in 
Dawkins’ non-relational view of information.9 For example, Davison (2012: 127–131) 
explains the working of the ‘Advice Dog’ internet meme by showing no less than 10 
images pertaining to the same meme and, indeed, outlining the relation between them. 
Knobel and Lankshear (2007: 209) explain that to characterize the ‘successfulness’ of 
the memes in their study they had to resort to investigating the “rich kind of inter-
textuality [of internet memes], such as wry cross-references to diff erent every day and 
popular culture events, icons or phenomena, and/or anomalous juxtapositions, usually 
of images”. Lunenfeld refers to internet memes as “a viral text – image matrix rather than 
a pseudo-genetic concept transfer” (Lunenfeld 2014: 255; my italics, S. C.). Th e popular 
website Knowyourmeme also lists a number of items in order to illustrate the history of 
a single internet meme. In short, when observing an internet meme, these commentators 
have not merely observed a single media text (a discrete unit), but a collection of objects 
and the way these objects have triggered one another and related to one another through 
time. So, if internet memes can only be studied in relation to their numerous adaptations 
and versions across a period of time, it follows that an internet meme cannot be defi ned 
as a single image or video or catchphrase (as per the ill-defi ned conceptions outlined 
above) or, in other words, as isolated information; instead, internet memes must be 
defi ned at the very least as systems.
Copying vs. translation
With the second statement (b) according to which memes are “distributed via copying 
between individuals”, Dawkins contended that memes can replicate through imitation. 
According to him, an important quality of a successful (meme) replicator would be 
copying-fi delity which would ensure the survival of the meme over a long period of 
time and would make it into a “viable unit of natural selection” (Dawkins 2006[1976]: 
9 It is interesting to see that, despite resorting to memetic theory to give accounts of what 
internet memes are, contemporary scholars and grassroots writers have embraced the systemic 
notion of memes to explain how internet memes work. Ontology (defi nitions of being) is 
strictly linked to epistemology (modus operandi of knowledge), so if a systemic view of internet 
memes is adopted in analysis, then a systemic view of internet memes should also be adopted 
when attempting to fi nd a general description for them. 
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195). However, contending that the complex mechanism for cultural evolution 
amounts to mere ‘copying’ appears to be a gross simplifi cation. Every web user knows 
that there exist several versions of the same internet meme, so how could ‘copying’ 
explain such a cultural variability? To disentangle this issue, let us start by noticing 
that the idea of ‘copying’ is grounded in the concept of information transmission. Th is 
view is evident in the following defi nitions which see memes as
(1) Culturally transmitted instructions (Dennett 1991, 1995; my italics, S. C.)
(2) Largest units of socially transmitted information that reliably and repeatedly withstand 
transmission (Pocklington, Best 1997: 81; my italics, S. C.)
(3) A message that is transmitted, subject to Shannon and Weaver information constraints 
(Wilkins 1998; my italics, S. C.).
Again, this conception of ‘information as transmitted’ was popularized by Shannon 
and Weaver’s Mathematical Th eory of Communication (1949). According to this 
model, a message is selected in the source, encoded into a signal and then transmitted 
along a channel to a decoder and eventually to a destination. Th is view’s lineage can 
be found in the post-war conception of communication which was concerned with 
encryption (encoding/decoding) and successful message delivery, that is, with the idea 
that a message sent by a source should be the same message which was received at 
destination. An interesting aspect of this model of communication is that it is grounded 
in thermodynamics. Th at is, the fi rst law of thermodynamics made clear that energy is 
not created but transferred; hence, in a similar fashion, Shannon and Weaver made clear 
that information, like energy, could be transferred, too, through a linear communication 
process. Attempts at transposing aspects of this energy-based model of information onto 
human communication were made by fi rst-wave cyberneticians in the 1940s (Wiener 
1948), second-wave cyberneticians in the 1980s (e.g. Luhmann 1986), to an extent, by 
semioticians infl uenced by cybernetics in the 1970s (Eco 1962; Sebeok 1991[1988]) and, 
as it appears, even by Dawkins himself and by memeticians in the 1990s. 
However information is a systemic phenomenon and cannot be thought of as being 
simplistically transferred from one mind to another. Th is issue was raised from within 
memetics by Gatherer who pointed out that the ‘transmission of belief ’ is diff erent 
from the transmission of information: “An individual may have a set of beliefs, but 
these cannot be memes, since they cannot be transmitted. All that can be transmitted 
is [technical] information. Belief is not itself information, but an attitude towards 
information” (Gatherer 1998: 12). In other words, ‘beliefs’ or ‘attitude’ are closer to 
phenomena such as perception, relevance, interpretation rather than the transmission 
of discrete units of information. Sperber also criticizes Dawkins’ and memetics’ 
emphasis on copying-as-transmission as he usefully explains that 
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[when doing an origami] the instructions are not being ‘copied’ in any useful 
sense […]Th e normalisation of the instructions results precisely from the fact 
that something other than copying is taking place. It results from the fact that the 
information provided by the stimulus is complemented with information already 
available in the system. (Sperber 2000: 9)
In other words, information deals with data/capta in context. One needs to add 
information to a text in order to allow it to provide information. For example, the 
beaches of the river Th ames in London are made up of mud, or pebbles at best, for the 
casual passer-by who glances at the river from its banks. But to the mudlarker, who 
ventures out of the cityscape and onto the shore, the beach of pebbles or mud yields a 
potential of natural and historical artefacts that have accumulated through centuries 
and millennia. To use Bateson’s expression, adding existing information to potential 
facts turns them into actual facts. In digital media, ‘remixing’ an internet meme would 
amount to adding information to it. Th is process allows the original, single media 
object to develop into an internet meme. Th erefore it would be more useful to think of 
(cultural) information as something that is at the very least constructed (Cannizzaro 
2013), rather than merely transferred, as the memeticians contended. 
Memetics’ scholars then, have missed the semiotic component of culture because 
the construction of information in living beings is too complex as a process to be solely 
thought of as ‘transmission’ or copying. According to Kull, a meme is a sign without 
triadic nature, however both terms [memes and signs] denote almost the same thing 
(Kull 2000: 115). Similarly, Deacon (1999) argues: 
A meme is a sign: some physical thing which, by virtue of some distinctive feature, 
can be recruited by an interpretive process within a larger system as re-presenting 
something else, conveying information into that system and reorganising it with 
respect to that something else.
Th e implication of these statements is immediate: signs make up texts, and texts are 
not passed on from person to person via copying, but are modelled or translated. 
“Copying”, writes Kull (2000: 109) “is a deterministic process, [whereas] translating 
is an interpretational process”. Taking up a similar approach in regard with internet 
memes, Shifman (2014: 354) argues how “Meme genres […] are operative signs: 
textual categories that are designed as invitations for (creative) action”. Hence, when 
talking about the ‘replication’ of internet memes, ‘translation’ is a more appropriate 
analytical model than ‘copying’ as it gives more room to account for the creativity 
embedded in the development of internet memes. So, dropping memetics’ jargon 
and adopting a systemic-semiotic perspective on digital culture instead allows us to 
consider internet memes as systems of signs that are subject to translation.
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‘Translation’ surpasses transmission as it encompasses the generation of new 
information which arises during the evolution of internet memes. Even within the 
context of digital culture, scholars have come to a similar conclusion: Knobel and 
Lankshear explain that copying or ‘replicability’ needs to include remixing as an 
im portant practice associated with many successful online memes. Th is musical 
metaphor includes “modifying, bricolaging, splicing, reordering, superimposing, etc., 
original and other images, sounds, fi lms, talks and so on” (Knobel, Lankshear 2007: 
208, 209; my italics, S. C.). However, referring to translation rather than remix enables 
us to access a range of semiotic terminology that is not available when relying on 
‘remix’ alone. 
Virality vs. habituescence
In any case, both translation and remix link to the next key feature of internet memes 
consisting, at root, in their ever-shift ing nature. Th e processual aspect of memes has 
traditionally been understood in memetics through the virus metaphor, as evinced 
in Dawkins’ statement that “memes travel longitudinally down generations, but they 
travel horizontally too, like viruses in an epidemic” (Blackmore 1999: ix). In internet 
culture, it is normally understood that in order to turn into an actual internet meme, 
a cultural object has to “go viral” fi rst. Yet in digital media theory, critical attempts 
have been made to understand Internet memes’ processual nature beyond the virus 
metaphor. For example, Nooney and Portwood-Stacer (2014: 250) explain how “in 
meme culture, fl ow takes primacy over origin, as the creator of an object and even 
the conditions in which it was made oft en remain unknown to the legions of users 
who remix it and pass it on”. Although, to be fair, creator or context of origin are oft en 
documented for historical reason, as a result of a mere ritual reconstruction habit, if at 
all. Th e point is that when it comes to the growth of internet memes, the explanatory 
model of cause-eff ect where there is a specifi c origin to a specifi c end, is not as 
important as what happens in between these two poles. Th e variety of translations that 
the internet memes undergo brings to the forefront the collective process of meaning-
making that constitutes the internet meme, and this process appears more important 
than the concern with “who created it fi rst”. In this respect Shifman (2014: 354; my 
italics, S. C.) argues: 
Th is series of transactions – in which still images activate videos, texts are linked 
with images, and one image is replaced by another – goes far beyond images’ 
referential content. It forefronts the technical and communicative potentialities 
embedded in the web, highlighting functionalities such as linking, windows, and 
interactive surfaces. 
576 Sara Cannizzaro
Within the context of collective co-creation, internet memes’ processual nature can 
then be conducted to a probabilistic process of change. By inserting probability into 
the equation, we approach a specifi c Peircean concept, that of habit. Habit for Peirce 
“is not something fi xed once for all, but, on the contrary, a fl exible rule of procedure” 
(Gorlée 2004: 63). Peirce explicates habit through his threefold philosophical model 
(fi rstness, secondness and thirdness), meaning that habit is a changeable, yet broadly 
reliable entity which contains at once the goal-directed stability of thirdness, the 
compulsiveness of secondness, and the germ of chaos subsumed in fi rstness. Th e 
probabilistic process of growth in habit sustained by these three levels is far removed 
from close-ended loops of cause and eff ect (Cannizzaro, Anderson 2016), as one 
would have it by understanding memes’ dynamics as virality.
On the contrary, considering an internet meme within the perspective of habit 
would imply that a reaction to particular circumstances is more or less likely to occur, 
not that it will be mechanically occur, nor that it will occur following a certain way 
or direction. In this light, networked internet communities would develop internet 
memes along paths of meaning that are probable, not certain. Hence internet memes’ 
processual nature could be understood in light of habituality, or what Peirce called 
‘habituescence’, the “consciousness of taking a habit” (MS 930: 31, 1913). Th e defi nition 
of internet memes in fact could be further pushed so as to encompass systems of signs 
that are subject to translation in habituescence, or, systems of signs with the tendency to 
take translational habits. But in this light, one can see how the development of internet 
memes is perhaps not that diff erent from the growth of any other instance of culture. 
Analysing Rebecca Black’s Friday
In relation to the analysis of texts, Lotman holds that for new information to be 
generated there must exist asymmetry in communication. For example, in the 
translation of a poem into another language, “instead of a precise correspondence, 
there is one of the possible interpretations, instead of a symmetrical transformation 
there is an asymmetrical one [...]” (Lotman 2001: 14). Asymmetry can be a useful 
analytical term for understanding the transformation of internet memes because it 
arises from the diff erence in ‘semiotic structures’ proposed by the remixing web user. 
For example, asymmetry can be observed in the translation of a famous internet meme 
called Rebecca Black’s Friday. Th e digital media text which originated this meme was a 
vanity video starring a 13-year old American teenager singing lyrics such as 
It’s Friday, Friday, 
Gotta get down on Friday, 
Everybody’s lookin’ forward to the weekend, weekend.
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Knowyourmeme explains that Rebecca Black’s Friday was fi rst uploaded on YouTube 
on 10 February 2011, but “it didn’t gain viral momentum until a month later when 
the popular Th e Daily What posted the video on 11 March 2011”.10 Just a week aft er 
Rebecca Black’s Friday went viral, or, in a semiotic framework, took up the habit of 
translation, numerous covers of the video appeared. Th is collective production 
triggered the identity switch of the video from single media text into an internet meme 
or a system of signs with the tendency to take new translational habits.
One of these translations, the cover song Death Metal Friday provided a metal 
soundtrack to the original video. Death Metal Friday starts off  with the original 
soundtrack but unexpectedly mutates to a death-metal voice and music as young 
Rebecca starts to sing; here, the new information that is generated in the asymmetry 
of translating from song to cover is found in the contradictory feel of its nonverbal 
communication: that is, we hear an over-exaggerated masculine guttural voice 
(vocal, nonverbal communication) springing out of the lips of a smiling teenager 
(visual, nonverbal communication). Death Metal Friday was updated on YouTube 
under the neutral nomenclature of ‘cover song’, but in the context of the growing 
popularity of the original song as “the worst song ever” (Parker 201111), the cover 
became a parody of Rebecca Black’s Friday. Hence, the contrast created at the level of 
nonverbal communication (masculine voice on young female face) constitutes the 
‘new information’ generated in the asymmetry: from celebrating the life of a teenage 
American girl, the video ends up ridiculing it; in other words, the change of habit 
marks the passage from self-celebration to parody, thus a change of media genre. 
However, there is more to asymmetry that can be observed in translation. As 
Lotman (2001: 143) asserts “if dialogue without semiotic diff erence is pointless, when 
the diff erence is absolute and mutually exclusive dialogue becomes impossible. So 
asymmetry [in translation] assumes a degree of invariancy”. ‘Invariancy’ is probably 
what memeticians tried to identify as copying-fi delity. Yet invariancy does not work 
outside a semiotic framework, and must be conceived alongside asymmetry and 
translation. In the context of the study of internet memes, invariancy can be thought 
of as a loose common principle – what in Propp’s (2000) terms may be called a 
‘similarity’ – rather than a set of fi xed informational units that are copied. However, 
one must admit that the looseness of such a principle must have constraints, or that 
there must be limits to the translational habit. Th ese are the limits towards which 
meaning gravitates asymptotically. Even for Propp, a text’s meaning is negotiated along 
constants and variables. So, on the one hand, and as for generic texts, asymmetry in 
10 http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/rebecca-black-friday.
11 Parker, Lyndsey 2011. Is YouTube sensation Rebecca Black’s “Friday” the worst song ever? 
Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110322133013/http://new.music.yahoo.com/blogs/
videogaga/71429/is-youtube-sensation-rebecca-blacks-friday-the-worst-song-ever/; accessed 
on 14 November 2016.
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internet meme ensures that a ‘polysemy of meanings’ (Altman 1999) can spring up 
during translation through the ‘germ of chaos’ of the internet meme habit in fi rstness; 
while, on the other hand, the expectations that web audiences put on internet memes, 
similarly to the expectations that mass audiences put on fi lm genre (Cobley 2001) 
constrain the translations and channel them on ‘meaning paths’. Th is latter level of 
meaning is arranged along thirdness, the goal-directed aspect of the internet meme 
habit. 
Figure 4a. 
Figure 4b. Image macro sprung from the Rebecca Black’s Friday internet meme, where the lyrics 
to the original songs “It’s Friday” have been substituted for pictures of eggs and for the text 
‘fried egg’.
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Figure 5a.
 
Figure 5b. Th e lyrics to Rebecca Black’s Friday are cited in these image macros belonging to the 
Advice Animal and Condescending Wonka internet memes respectively.
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Th e various versions of the internet meme are not randomly produced but follow 
certain constraints. For example, in the case of Rebecca Black’s Friday, the ridiculing 
and negative expectations that the web users put on the video, and on subsequent 
remixes of it, were not randomly generated but were constrained by notable comments 
(a general idea, or thirdness to which the meme-habit tends). In fact, a few days aft er 
the video took its growth habit (11 March 2011), YouTube Trends Team explained that 
“Partly attributable to the sudden rise were postings by some infl uential tweeters on 
Friday who helped spread the music video” (YouTube Trends 201612). One of these 
infl uential tweets by American comedian Michael Nelson (2011) read “Let this be on 
your lips as you head into the weekend http://youtu.be/CD2LRROpph0 (it also answer 
the ? ‘what’s the worst video ever made?’)”. Th is man’s reaction to Rebecca Black’s Friday 
provided a model for interpreting the video as something to laugh at, because the high 
number of YouTube viewings that followed was accompanied by negative comments 
and the visible increase of thumbs down on YouTube by the second. In short, ‘the 
worst video ever made’ comment provided semiotic constraints to the polysemy of 
meanings that the video could have triggered, and broadly channelled web audiences 
expectations’ towards laughter and mocking, which then gave rise to the birth of 
several parodies of the video.
Invariancy can also be identifi ed in the translation of Rebecca Black’s Friday from 
video to image macro.13 Brideau and Berret (2014: 307) explain how the Impact 
typeface that is used in image-macros produces standardization and innovation. 
In fact, lyrics from the song’s chorus in the original video read “Today it is Friday”; 
however, when the video was posted on to the infl uential blog Th e Daily What, the 
platform which marked the rise of the video’s popularity, one of the comments to the 
video read “Is it just me, or does anyone else hear ‘Fried Egg?’”, to whom somebody 
replied “i did! really........i was like.....what fried egg?? then i heard it for the second 
time and i was like.......oh. FRIDAY. Duh” (the Daily What 201114). Th ese comments 
have provided the semiotic constraints for a change in habit of the internet meme. 
As Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b show, Rebecca Black’s Friday morphed from video into a series 
of image macros where the lyrics ‘Friday’ were substituted for the text ‘fried egg’, and 
pictures of eggs were roughly photoshopped onto smiling Rebecca as a means to 
anchor the new verbal message. Here, asymmetry can be observed in the change of 
verbal communication from ‘Friday’ to ‘fried egg’ (written, verbal communication). 
12 YouTube Trends 2016. Th e Rebecca Black Phenomenon. Available at http://youtube-trends.
blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/rebecca-black-phenomenon.html and accessed on 26 May 2016.
13 In the context of digital culture, an image macro is an image bearing superimposed text 
typically using an impact typeface and seeking to be funny.
14 Th e Daily What 2011 was accessed at http://thedailywhat.tumblr.com/post/3786344046/
where-is-your-god-now-of-the-day-i-am-no-longer on 16 January, 2014.
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Invariancy, on the other hand, is in the mental image of the sound (oral, verbal 
communication) that the word ‘Friday’ when uttered may produce (as it sounds as 
‘fried egg’). Th e invariance in the imagined oral-verbal communication resonates with 
the thirdness aspect of the meme’s habit, whereas its asymmetry at the level of written 
verbal communication triggers a habit change in the internet meme at the level of 
fi rstness. 
‘Friday’ and ‘fried egg’ in turn placed semiotic constraints on the development 
of new image macros where Rebecca Black’s Friday fuses with other internet memes 
such as the Advice animal15 (Fig. 5a) and Condescending Wonka (Fig. 5b) internet 
meme16 and takes up a new habit altogether. What is interesting about this fusion or 
habit-taking is that the familiar teenager’s face does not need to be in the picture for 
the image macro to be recognized as Rebecca Black's Friday internet meme. So if the 
visual elements of these images macros appear diff erent (asymmetry), the connection 
between the two (invariance) is made verbally. Hence the dynamic growth of the 
internet meme or its more fundamental change of habit, is in the switch of channel 
between verbal and nonverbal modes, showing that habit change can cut across 
thirdness and fi rstness in diff erent ways.
Conclusion
Contemporary popular culture has chosen to baptize the phenomenon which sees 
certain digital media texts going ‘viral’ and being collectively remixed as ‘internet 
memes’. Th is choice of term is indebted to Dawkins’ theory of culture-as-memes as 
proposed in his book Th e Selfi sh Gene, and later supported by scholars of memetics. 
However this choice also imported into digital culture the theoretical assumptions, and 
their limitations, which became associated with memetics. Th is article has shown how 
memetics’ emphasis on memes as ‘units’ of cultural evolution is a conception indebted 
to early information theory and resonates with structuralism’s conception of signifying 
unit too. However this view was already surpassed by cybernetics (Bateson 1970), 
and has been made obsolete by semiotics (Tartu–Moscow semiotics and especially 
Lotman 2001), biosemiotics (Hoff meyer 1996, 2008) and cybersemiotics (Brier 2008) 
and in retrospect, also Peircean semiotics (MS 930: 31–33, 1913). Th ese frameworks 
instead suggest that information should be considered as a relational entity. Hence, 
15 Davison explains that this internet meme is characterized by an image of animal in front 
of rainbow with a fi rst line of advice followed by a second line of advice (usually a punch line) 
(Davison 2012: 127).
16 Th is meme features “a screen capture of actor Gene Wilder in the 1971 musical Willy Wonka 
and the Chocolate Factory [... who is depicted] as patronizing and sarcastic” (Condescending 
Wonka 2014).
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if memes-as-cultural-information should be thought of as relational entities, internet 
memes should be thought of as systems. Also, memetics’ view of cultural evolution as 
the ‘distribution of memes between individuals via copying’ is a conception grounded 
again in the idea of information transmission. Developments in semiotics suggest that 
memes should be considered as signs (Deacon 1999; Kull 2000), an observation which 
in turn suggests that it would be useful to think of internet memes as sign systems. 
Th e semiotic turn on memes implies that ‘copying’ is no longer an appropriate choice 
to account for the growth of culture. At the very least, cultural change should be seen 
as translation, which enables one to envisage the generation of new information. In 
this view, internet memes are to be considered as systems of signs that are subject to 
translation. 
Th e choice of adopting ‘translation’ rather than ‘remix’ (a consensual term in digital 
media theory) in order to account for the morphing of isolated digital media texts into 
internet memes, allows us to adopt analytical terms that belong to the tradition of the 
semiotics of culture. Th rough a semiotic analysis of the Rebecca Black’s Friday internet 
meme, it has been shown how the terms ‘asymmetry’ and ‘invariance’ can help us to 
identify and analyse important moments in the evolution of internet memes. 
Finally, it was shown that while the processual nature of internet memes has 
been brutally labelled as ‘viral’ following memetics, this process can in fact be better 
understood by the semiotic model of habit as proposed by Peirce. Particularly, 
the notion of ‘habituescence’ or the taking up of a habit, enables the defi nition of 
internet memes as systems of signs with the tendency to take up a fl exible, intelligent 
translational habit. Th is habit can be understood as a law of the mind that contains 
within itself a germ of chaos at the level of fi rstness (a trigger to change generated 
through translational asymmetry), a compulsive aspect at the level of secondness 
(the act of translation itself) and a reliable component at the level of thirdness (the 
invariance aspect of translation).
In conclusion, the pragmatic concerns covered in this article include concepts 
such as the unit of information, copying, and virality. Th ese points all challenge the 
method for most cultural analysis on account of the qualifi able, fl uidic nature of digital 
cultures. Yet Lotman’s and Peirce’s doctrines of translation and habituescence come 
a good deal closer towards a critical conception of culture more broadly, whilst also 
extending these advanced semiotic principles as infl ected by bio- and cybersemiotics. 
And so, within this enlarged conception, historical and contemporary analyses 
of digital culture can profi t much in assigning more apposite and precise semiotic 
terminology with the popular legacy left  by memetics, its allied disciplines, and 
even incipient, contemporary sequels.
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Интернет-мемы как знаки интернета: 
семиотический взгляд на дигитальную культуру
Статья ставит целью более четкое структурирование интернет-мемов. Наука о 
мемах, «меметика», предполагает, что мемы остаются ‘репликаторами, копирующими 
единицами’, как это было высказано в знаменитой работе Ричарда Докинза 
«Эгоистичный ген» (1976). Пирсовская семиотика и биосемиотика могут бросить вызов 
этой доктрине информа ционной передачи. Поддерживая рассмотрение интернет-мемов 
в точной дискурсивной рамке, при помощи семиотического чтения реконфигурируются 
совре менные формулировки понятия мема. Интернет-мемы могут и должны быть 
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поняты как вызывающие привычку знаковые системы, которые охватывают и 
процессы, содержащие асимметричную вариативность. В статье предлагается, исходя 
из принципов биосемиотики, Тартуско-московской школы и семиотики Пирса, 
посредством вниматель ного чтения (close reading) знаменитого интернет-мема 2011 
года «Rebecca Black’s Friday», рабочая схема для определения интернет-мемов и его 
применимости для семиотического анализа текстов новой медии.
Internetimeemid kui internetimärgid: 
semiootiline pilk digitaalkultuurile
Artiklis püütakse leida selgemat raamistust internetipõhistele meemidele. Järgides selle 
mõiste populariseerimist Richard Dawkinsi kuulsas teoses “Isekas geen” (1976), eeldatakse 
memeetikaks nimetatavas meemiteaduses, et meemid jäävad ‘kopeerivateks’ üksusteks. 
Siiski võivad Peirce’i semiootika ja biosemiootika sellele informatsiooni edastuse doktriinile 
väljakutse esitada. Toetades internetimeemide käsitlemist täpses ja diskursiivses raamistuses, 
rekonfi gureeritakse semiootilisel lugemisel nüüdseks kehtestatud meemide mõiste kaasaegseid 
formuleeringuid. Internetimeeme saab ja tuleb seega mõista kui harjumusi põhjustavaid 
märgisüsteeme, mis hõlmavad asümmeetrilist variatiivsust sisaldavaid protsesse. Nii pakutakse 
käesolevas artiklis biosemiootikast, Tartu-Moskva semiootikast ja Peirce’i semiootilistest 
põhimõtetest lähtudes ning 2011. aastal tuntust kogunud internetimeemi “Rebecca Blacki 
reede” lähilugemise kaudu välja töökava internetimeemide defi neerimiseks ning rakendamiseks 
uue meеdia tekstide semiootilisel analüüsil.
